The approach study of cooperative behavior in experimental and behavioral economic. An exploratory analysis of the assumptions applied in cooperative games theory studies.

From an economic approach, specifically considering studies under the framework of cooperative game theory, the individual behavior has been analyzed mainly from an individual economic perspective, related to a monetary pay... [ view full abstract ]

From an economic approach, specifically considering studies under the framework of cooperative game theory, the individual behavior has been analyzed mainly from an individual economic perspective, related to a monetary pay for behave by an specific manner, considering as relevant just the maximization of individual economic benefits. However, there are many different reasons to manifest a cooperative behavior.

Nachar (2013), considering the arguments exposed by Birchall and Simmons (2004), Borgen (2004), Jones et al. (2009), McCain (2008), Tabellini (2008), Ostrom (2000, 2002) and McCain (2008), propose a model under which explain the possible arguments to analyze the cooperative behavior and the characteristics of people and cooperativized activity that enable to develop a activity under a cooperative approach. In this model, the author propose four possible motivations, or objectives, to manifest a cooperative behavior: 1) Individual economic objectives, 2) Collective economic objectives, 3) Individual non-economic objectives, or 4) Non-economic, with no personal expectation, objectives. Also, the author explains that is necessary to analyze characteristics about the possible cooperators and the cooperativized activity.

The aim of this study is to develop an analysis about the scope of analysis of cooperative behavior from the perspective of experimental economics and economy of behavior, considering the classical cooperative games purposed by the cooperative game theory. Specifically, the purpose is to examine the approach under which the experiments about cooperative behavior are realized, using as reference the framework proposed by Nachar (2013), analyzing if the type of experiments related to cooperative games theory are applied just considering individual economic pays or compensations, corresponding to economic individual objectives, money, or applying different types of compensations (Collective economic pays, non-economic individual compensations or non-economic with no personal expectation pays).

The study contributes to enhancing knowledge in the field of cooperative games theory and experimental economics, proposing an alternative, broader, approach to analyze the reasons that explains the cooperative behavior, a more representative framework to study the cooperative behavior from an economic perspective.