Trust beyond Reason – Lévinas and Trust

Interpersonal trust is often related to reasoning. However, reasoning cannot completely explain trust. At some point, actors cannot know enough in order to make informed trust decisions. Moreover, trust itself only occurs when... [ view full abstract ]

Interpersonal trust is often related to reasoning. However, reasoning cannot completely explain trust. At some point, actors cannot know enough in order to make informed trust decisions. Moreover, trust itself only occurs when knowledge is incomplete. In order to explain trust we have to include the non-rational element of it – the leap of faith.
I take Lévinas’ thought as point of departure. His philosophy emphasises the fundamental otherness of the Other, which we can by no means completely translate into our own categories. So he helps us to understand why our knowledge of the other is always incomplete. Further, he distinguishes between Saying and Said. Whereas the Said is the spoken or written word already in the realm of consciousness, Saying is the passing act of expressing. Hence, Saying is the pre-rational giving of signs – an ethical response to the Other. However, Saying and Said cannot exist without each other but are different in their very nature.
Understanding trust as form of Lévinas’ Saying helps us to understand why we cannot explain trust in terms of reasoning. Trust is then to be understood as pre-rational – as form of an ethical response to the Other, whom we can and should not control.