A global diffusion of Freedom of Information (FOI) policies took place with the rising of human rights and “good governance” agendas. The conventional explanation states it resulted from policy transfers by learning of international standards. Brazilian FOI policy is within the top-ten group in adherence to such standards in topics associated with general aspects of the right to information (precedence, entitlement, scope, and promotion). But within this group, Brazil occupies the last positions in adherence related to procedures to make information available (processing of requests, exceptions, appeals, and sanctions). Can such ambivalence be explained?
The policy transfer of FOI in Brazil occurred through different decision channels and with the engagement of non-independent government offices, IGOs, NGOs and “parliamentary alliances” for pro- and non-governmental preferences. There were four controversial issues whose results in the new policy correspond to this ambivalence. While the broad scope of FOI and the 50-years limit of secrecy represented a higher adherence, the non-autonomous coordination of implementation and the non-independent final decision on appeals depicted mismatches.
This study assumes this transfer represents an ambiguous legitimacy-based emulation process, oriented towards the homogenization to the international field, but without breaking the previous internal logic of governmental control of information. The hypothesis is that the highlighted ambivalence resulted from disputes and compromises of actors’ power preferences for change (+adherence) or continuity (-adherence) on the controversial issues. The aim is to analyze how such political dynamics has forged this transfer producing different adherence levels. The methodology adopts process-tracing with documentary analysis and interviews.
The proposed causal theory indicates the political dynamics represents a causal mechanism composed of the actors' contradictory preferences, mediated by the balance of their power resources and decision-making rules applied. Such mechanism is conceptualized into three steps: interests on controversial issues, conflicts and negotiations for/within channels, and resulting adherence levels. The second step comprises the participants within channels, battles and power positions, specific preferences and issues in dispute, exogenous and endogenous shifts, decision rules applied, power resources mobilized, and partial outcome.
Evidence points out that the political dynamics explains how such ambivalence was produced. While the priorities of IGOs, NGOs and the parliamentary front for FOI were the secrecy limitation and the FOI scope expansion, the pro-government coalition sought to keep the prerogatives to oversee and coordinate implementation and to decide on appeals with government offices. In conflicts and negotiations for these interests, such organizations and groups explored their competencies, reputation and “soft spots” in decision rules. The resulting difference between adherence levels indicates there was a political trade-off that led these actors to give up their second preferences to ensure their priorities.
The results of this study demonstrate that politics and institutions matter for the analyzed transfer. The adopted strategies were highly oriented to power and legitimacy, and there were no “winners taking all.” Although a part of the new rules and procedures characterize an on-path change that maintained the control of information, they also reproduce the preferences of the non-governmental coalition to limit such power.
