Subsidized Home–ownership Programs, Transaction Costs, and Domestic Violence

We exploit the random assignment rule implemented by the government ofthe municipality of Salto (Argentina) in its program of social housing inorder to identify the effect of the program on subsequent domestic... [ view full abstract ]

We exploit the random assignment rule implemented by the government of
the municipality of Salto (Argentina) in its program of social housing in
order to identify the effect of the program on subsequent domestic violence.
Beneficiaries receive a finished house in exchange for a long-term credit
at a heavily subsidized rate, and are entitled to legal ownership after full
payment. Using administrative records from the population of applicants,
we find that subsidized home-ownership programs to low-income households
are associated to an increase in reported domestic violence. We explore
various potential mechanisms and we conclude that the empirical evidence
only favors the mechanism of an increase in transaction costs associated to
exiting a relationship.