Populism and the Return of the "Paranoid Style": Some Evidence and a Simple Model of Demand for Incompetence as Insurance against Elite Betrayal

Abstract

We present a simple model of populism as the rejection of “disloyal” leaders. We show that adding the assumption that people are worse off when they experience low income as a result of leader betrayal (than when it is the... [ view full abstract ]

Authors

  1. Rafael Di Tella (Harvard Business School)
  2. Julio Rotemberg (Harvard Business School)

Topic Area

P. Economic Systems: P1. Capitalist Systems

Session

CS4-08 » Political Economy 2 (14:15 - Friday, 10th November, Dali)

Paper

A_Paranoid_Jul_12__2017.pdf

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