One-to-One Optimal Stable Matchings with Indifferences

Abstract

 Vade Vate (1989) and Rothblum (1992) characterized the stable matchings of the marriage model with strict preferences as extreme points of a polytope generated by a system of linear inequalities. In this paper, we extend... [ view full abstract ]

Authors

  1. Noelia Juarez (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (UNSL-CONICET))
  2. Pablo A. Neme (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis)
  3. Jorge Oviedo (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis)

Topic Areas

C. Mathematical and Quantitative Methods: C6. Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • , C. Mathematical and Quantitative Methods: C7. Game Theory and Bargaining Theory , D. Microeconomics: D4. Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

Session

CS2-13 » Economic Theory 3 (17:45 - Thursday, 9th November, Room 13)

Paper

JuarezNemeOviedo.pdf

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