Pareto Undominated Allocation by Strategy-Proof Mechanisms

We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with a social endowment of multiple commodities and multidimensional single-peaked preferences. Using the property of multidimensional replacement monotonicity, we: (i)... [ view full abstract ]

We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with a social endowment of multiple commodities and multidimensional single-peaked preferences. Using the property of multidimensional replacement monotonicity, we: (i) establish sufficient conditions for a rule to be Pareto undominated strategy-proof (Anno and Sasaki, 2013); (ii) present a multidimensional version of the "sequential rules" introduced by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) and show that they are Pareto undominated strategy-proof; and (iii) give a new characterization of the "multidimensional uniform rule" (Amorós,  2002).