Non-Conceptuality in the Buddha's Awakening

My thesis in Religion seeks to understand how Classical Indian Buddhists have reconciled two conflicting claims about the Buddha’s awakening. On the one hand, the Buddha’s awakening is utterly non-conceptual, with some... [ view full abstract ]

My thesis in Religion seeks to understand how Classical Indian Buddhists have reconciled two conflicting claims about the Buddha’s awakening. On the one hand, the Buddha’s awakening is utterly non-conceptual, with some arguing that it is devoid of content. On the other hand, the Buddha uses this allegedly content-less experience as epistemological grounds to make specific statements about (i) the nature of reality and (ii) how one can use this insight into the nature of reality to bring about the end of suffering. The question, then, is the following: how can the Buddha make a statement that has specific content on the basis of an experience that is defined to be devoid of any kind of specificity? Buddhist scholars have struggled with this question, providing answers that run the gamut from a positive (katophatic) description of awakening to a negative (apophatic) one. Following the hermeneutical approach of scholars ranging from Paul Griffiths to John Keenan, my research outlines an intellectual history of this debate, from its beginning in the Kathāvatthu (ca. 3rd century B.C.E.) to more sophisticated arguments in the commentaries on Maitreya’s Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga and Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasaṅgraha (ca. 4th century C.E.).