Bridging the "Yawning Gap": Richard C. Patterson, John Moors Cabot, and the Transformation of U.S. Embassy Policy in Yugoslavia from 1946 to 1948

After Yugoslavia became the first communist country to break away from the Soviet Union’s leadership in June 1948, the U.S. provided economic and military aid to support a Yugoslav Government under threat from a Soviet-led... [ view full abstract ]

After Yugoslavia became the first communist country to break away from the Soviet Union’s leadership in June 1948, the U.S. provided economic and military aid to support a Yugoslav Government under threat from a Soviet-led embargo and potential invasion. Although historians have thoroughly studied post-1948 U.S.-Yugoslav collaboration, they have overlooked the limited progress toward reconciliation in 1947 and the first half of 1948 that later made such collaboration possible. This thesis studies the Yugoslav-U.S. relationship of 1946-1948 through the lens of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, the central American presence in Yugoslavia. The hostile attitude of U.S. Ambassador Richard C. Patterson, along with conflicts over aviation and the Italian-Yugoslav border, poisoned bilateral relations in 1946. Patterson's departure, however, and the arrival of the more conciliatory John Moors Cabot as head of mission transformed U.S. Embassy policy in Yugoslavia. More genuine American efforts to address Yugoslav grievances and softer Yugoslav stances in 1947 and 1948 produced limited but significant steps toward compromise. This progress ultimately laid groundwork for the Embassy's apprehension of the Yugoslav-Soviet split and removed roadblocks to the U.S. Government's cautious but efficient turn towards reconciliation with Yugoslavia. Foretelling Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's policy of detente towards the Soviet Union two decades later, then, American officials in Yugoslavia had already de-prioritized ideology for the sake of lessening tensions with the Communist government--even before the June 1948 rift provided a golden opportunity for further U.S.-Yugoslav rapprochement.