Technology transfer with search intensity and project advertising

In this paper technology transfer is the result of a matching process between heterogeneous Knowledge Transfer Offices (KTOs) and innovative firms. We improve on existing matching literature by embedding technology transfer... [ view full abstract ]

In this paper technology transfer is the result of a matching process between heterogeneous Knowledge Transfer Offices (KTOs) and innovative firms. We improve on existing matching literature by embedding technology transfer market search into an intertemporal model of utility and profit maximization. Precisely, the model endogenizes the process, which drives the dynamics of university researchers in search, firm vacant projects, search intensity and projects advertising. We obtain three main results. First, from the microfoundation of the matching process we show that KTOs reservation fee rate must be higher than the ratio between the marginal researcher cost and the marginal utility of matched projects. Second, the technology transfer strictly depends on the efficiency units of searching researchers and vacant projects. Hence, the ratio between vacant projects and researchers in search (tightness) is affected by search intensity and job advertising. However, this latter relationship generates ambiguous results in the matching process. We demonstrate that if firms search too intensively the other side of the market for project matches, the equilibrium KTOs’ search intensity may be too low. This happens because both sides ignore the positive externality of their search effort. Behavioral complementarity, substitutability, and free riding are all potential equilibrium outcomes.