CITIZENS' PREFERENCES FOR LOWER PAY FOR POLITICIANS: TRUST ISSUES OR INEQUALITY AVERSION?

Citizens are generally highly averse to increases in politicians’ pay. In this paper, we investigate key mechanisms that can explain this aversion. Specifically, we investigate the degree to which aversion to high pay for... [ view full abstract ]

Citizens are generally highly averse to increases in politicians’ pay. In this paper, we investigate key mechanisms that can explain this aversion. Specifically, we investigate the degree to which aversion to high pay for politicians is moderated by institutional delegation of this issue, and the degree to which it is moderated by citizens’ trust in politicians and their general attitudes on economic inequality. Using a survey experiment (n~2,000), we confirm that citizens’ aversion to higher pay for politicians is moderated by institutional delegation, although the degree to which politicians can avoid adverse reactions to higher pay through delegation is limited. Further, we show that trust in politicians is a key predictor of attitudes regarding pay for politicians, explaining even more than general economic attitudes regarding income inequality. Thus, attitudes on pay for politicians are closely linked to the fundamental relationship citizens and politicians. We also find that while citizens’ trust matters greatly for their attitudes regarding politicians pay, changes in the pay does not affect trust. Proposed cuts in politicians’ pay do not increase citizen’s trust in the politicians.