Public administration scholars have argued that engaging citizens in the decision making process of the government has both instrumental and intrinsic value (Bingham, 2005; Nabatchi, 2012; Nabatchi 2010). In spite of a plethora of collaborative initiatives in developing countries aimed at improving inter-departmental coordination and citizen participation to address wicked problems, little systematic research has been conducted at the subnational level, where the implementation happens, to examine how bureaucrats interpret, operationalize, communicate, and diffuse information related to collaborative governance mechanisms and how these dynamics shape the policy implementation processes and outcomes.
The paper explores the question whether collaborative governance mechanisms have an instrumental value, i.e., do they facilitate boundary spanning work, address the concerns of accountability and transparency, and thus improve the overall quality of service delivery. To do this, the paper examines the policy formulation and implementation processes of a collaborative governance initiative, called Project C, in one of India’s subnational regions, aimed at improving maternal and child health services through inter-departmental coordination and community participation. The overarching research question is: how do bureaucrats in an intergovernmental setting shape the implementation processes of a collaborative governance initiative?
Using the case study research methodology, qualitative data was collected from multiple sources to ensure effective triangulation of data. Data was collected through interviews of 86 officials, mid-level managers, and frontline staff involved in the implementation, program-level documents, and observations of 28 street-level collaborative meetings and other administrative processes. Data was analyzed using thematic codes from organization theory and relevant literature in NVivo 11.
Findings and analysis compare the policy of implementing Project C and the implementation of that policy. The overarching finding is that while the policy of implementation is one of collaborative action, implementation of the policy was skewed towards programmatic indicators dominated by the health department’s agenda. How did this happen? The policy implementation literature would explain this as goal divergence because of using bureaucratic discretion. The collaborative governance literature would explain that the necessary conditions like shared power, inter-dependence, shared goals or transformational leadership must be missing. Both these explanations are valid, but such implementation outcomes are so common in developing countries that a more robust theoretical understanding is needed. Key decision makers in developing country contexts are aware that most often the necessary conditions for effective implementation of collaborative arrangements are absent, but are still mandated to collaborate. This paper attempts to theorize such outcomes through the lens of a bureaucratic-collaboration paradigm. The bureaucratic-collaboration paradigm has three aspects: first, that a collaborative governance initiative is reduced to a formalized set of instructions with the aim of institutionalizing collaborative practices among the participants, second, that collaborative structures are inherently political and that they are not necessarily meant for the mutual benefit of the actors and institutions involved as they create a clear set of winners and losers, and third, that formal authority and power is needed to make bureaucratic actors collaborate across departmental boundaries. In effect, the findings underscore the paradoxical nature of implementing collaborative governance regimes.
Jagannath_IRSPM2018_BureaucraticCollaboration.pdf 