Water falls and flows, while states occupy fixed space: in Southern Africa, with its odd amalgam of colonially defined borders, this is a problem. The organization of the region’s states stands at odds with the character of... [ view full abstract ]
Water falls and flows, while states occupy fixed space: in Southern Africa, with its odd amalgam of colonially defined borders, this is a problem. The organization of the region’s states stands at odds with the character of its water resource flows, both in space and in time. If people and ecosystems are to survive and thrive, this natural resource must be managed holistically, i.e. in terms of the hydrological cycle as that cycle changes through time. The historical approach to water management worldwide is the capturing and taming of a fugitive and wild resource – note the language of discipline and control. Where the resource is shared by two or more sovereign states, however, resource capture – physically through the application of various infrastructure and legally through the codification of actions in policy and law – is bound to be problematic: socially, politically, economically, environmentally and possibly militarily. For many years there has been speculation regarding the possibility of water wars in the region, with several basins having been identified to be ‘at risk’ of violent conflict. Hence the importance of sharing water fairly and sustainably.
The focus of this paper is on the process and practice of sharing the region’s water by Southern African Development Community (SADC) member-states. The paper illustrates how Southern Africa serves as a mostly willing subject for global experiments in IWRM and good water governance. SADC’s long-standing relationship with the EU and the Nordics, which began in the late 1970s in the struggle against apartheid, ensures an endless stream of money, technology, expertise and comradely good will. The nature of the region’s political economy demands fundamental reforms in the way water is used and by whom. But, paradoxically, it is also this political economy which, in the context of neoliberal globalization, encourages decision makers to stay the course: more mines, more cash crops, less deliberate state intervention on behalf of those most in need. So, the ‘institutional configurations and orientations’ remain centred on the sovereign state, with state governors being the recognized seat of decision-taking authority, and with (often foreign) expert knowledge constituting the scientific and technical basis for action. We remain, unfortunately, a long way from the IWRM/good governance ideal.
