The present work is perfect accommodation on the subject on the reliability and human error, on the railway, which will address the Congress. With this work, we intend to confront two traditions of research on prevention of... [ view full abstract ]
The present work is perfect accommodation on the subject on the reliability and human error, on the railway, which will address the Congress.
With this work, we intend to confront two traditions of research on prevention of accidents and two different ways to understand the human involvement in the production of unwanted, so prevails that option that does not understand the human as source of error but as a steward by certain shared form of global security.
The current hegemony of thought mechanistic, anchored in the image of the machine, proceeding consisting in decomposing complex things for its explanation, analytical, and strong causality, is that has made it possible to talk of the human being, almost exclusively, as a mere element or causal factor of the risk situations in which dilute the shared responsibility, perhaps in equal parts, of the different actors (technicians, administrators, business managers, including those responsible for politicians, etc.), by an insufficient global security response.
The study of the human reliability in the railway field, with methods that focus their interest in the probability of human error (THERP, HEART) has at its core, usually, mechanistic thought and the compression of the human being with the analogy of machine.
According to this perspective, still dominant, human action, in the style of machines, can be understood based on a number of basic elements that can be adjusted within narrow margins of variation that have been previously established. In this way, those behaviors that are not within these narrow margins, that have been set by third-party technicians, can be considered as devious or incorrect and converted into cause of the unintended consequences.
Our proposal in this paper will be to understand the human, not as a factor, reduced to a mathematical magnitude or likely, but as some strands woven together with others, that it is impossible to separate it without changing its identity.
This perspective we committed to the responsibility that people and organizations can have in the production of non-press and unforeseen situations and does not, on the other hand, with human error.
To achieve this goal, we have used a strategy that focuses its interest in human behavior and the internal and external factors affecting it. On this occasion, our work aims to influence the behaviour of safety of workers through the study of the perception of risk, according to the theory of Rasmussen.
According to this approach has been organized a formation which aims to modify the behavior of security, not from the objectivity of the technical training but through the handling of the emotions that cause the testimonies from colleagues who have been involved in adverse events.
Signaller performance, workload, situation awareness , Human error and human reliability