The whole kit and caboodle: applying a systems analysis and design framework across the rail level crossing design lifecycle

The long-standing worldwide issue of rail level crossing collisions needs little introduction in these circles. In Australia (where this research is being undertaken), between 2000 and 2009 there were almost 700 collisions... [ view full abstract ]

The long-standing worldwide issue of rail level crossing collisions needs little introduction in these circles. In Australia (where this research is being undertaken), between 2000 and 2009 there were almost 700 collisions between road vehicles and trains at rail level crossings, resulting in 97 fatalities (Independent Transport Safety Regulator, 2011). Despite various initiatives, in 2011 there were 49 collisions between trains and road vehicles at rail level crossing in Australia, leading to 33 fatalities (ATSB, 2012). The problem is not only limited to collisions between trains and vehicles; off the road there were 92 collisions between trains and pedestrians at RLXs between 2002 and 2012 (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2012). The issue represents a ‘systems’ problem in that all users of rail level crossings have some risk of being involved in a collision.

The continued incidence of trauma at rail level crossings is unacceptable, and provides clear evidence that the current approach to rail level crossing safety is failing. In recent times researchers have suggested that this may be due to the fact that there is a general lack of understanding of behaviour at rail level crossings (Edquist et al, 2009) and also because a systems thinking approach has not been adopted when attempting to improve rail level crossing designs (e.g. Read et al, 2013; Salmon et al, 2013). In the case of the latter, it is argued that a focus on components in isolation (such as road users, or warnings) has led to incremental design changes that can have only marginal effects. This ‘fix the broken component’ mentality has previously come under criticism and is generally accepted to be a limited approach to safety management (e.g. Dekker, 2011); however, despite repeated calls, a systems thinking approach to rail level crossing safety has yet to materialise.

The research described in this paper is a direct response to this. The paper presents an overview of a rail level crossing design lifecycle process that involved applying a systems analysis and design framework, Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA; Vicente, 1999) first to analyse existing rail level crossing systems, and then to generate, evaluate, and refine new rail level crossing design concepts designed to improve safety. The process was adopted as part of a major research program currently being undertaken in Victoria, Australia. The aim is to propose new and evaluate new safer rail level crossing system designs.

The paper will provide an overview of the overall process adopted and will present and discuss selected outputs from each of the following phases: systems analysis and problem identification; generation of design concepts, evaluation of design concepts, and refinement of design concepts. In closing, the implications for future rail level crossing design activities will be discussed, along with the benefits of using CWA In this manner.