The functioning of inter-firm cooperation requires the coordination of the behaviour of the involved actors. For cooperation as inter-organizational relations, a degree of organization is necessary to coordinate the behaviour of the actors involved, regardless of whether they are controlled by a central governing body in the sense of Hobbes (1984) [1651], or whether they are without a central rule (= heterarchical cooperation). Coordinated behaviour, which cannot be adequately explained by hierarchy and market, is explained with trust. Although different types of trust (instrumental, maxim-based, norm-based) are differentiated, the explanation of the emergence of trust is essentially eliminated. In general, trust and (exchange) relationships, as given in cooperation, are based on reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity is seen as a condition for trust building, which is regarded as enabling relationships and coordinating behaviour. People tend to stand mainly for their own interests. Those approaches that reject the formation of cooperation without a central rule raise the question of what is the case when no rule forces the parties to cooperate. The basic problem lies in the pursuit of the self-interest of each individual, which leads to a bad result for all. Reciprocity plays a decisive role in the form of an individual action motif, which characterizes the self-interest of the actors.
This contribution targets the research gap of coordinating behaviour in inter-firm cooperation without coordination by hierarchy or the market. Thus, the paper deals with the research question: What types of reciprocity do the economics and social science literature know? How can these types be characterized? Which reciprocity types are relevant for the explanation of coordinated behaviour in heterarchical interfirm cooperation? The focus is on an inter-organizational level.
The aim of the contribution is to generate a morphological box: types of reciprocity known in the literature are characterized, anchored within theories on reciprocity and finally linked to the specific cooperation context.
Although in the social sciences discussion (Homans, 1961, Blau, 1964, Emerson, 1976) has long been taking place, in economics an exploration of the topic of reciprocity has only been taking place since the 1990s. This examination is mainly based on game theory (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984). Reciprocity is understood as a form of social preference.
In the context of a systematic literature review, reciprocity types known in the literature are elaborated on the basis of the theoretical framework in order to answer the research question. Thus, the identification of different reciprocity types for different cooperation contexts (heterarchical interfirm cooperation in the initiation phase or in the existence phase) is expected.
In order to derive propositions on the role of reciprocity in organized heterarchical inter-firm cooperation in different development phases, a systematic literature review is conducted, which is guided by the research question.
First, a basic understanding of the reciprocity concept is developed. Subsequently, databases on journal contributions are examined to determine the reciprocity types of these journal contributions. Here, no contextual containment is undertaken in order to be able to generate as comprehensive a picture as possible of the reciprocity types discussed. Finally, a morphological box is created. This box shows the types of reciprocity, documents their occurrences in the literature and fixes them in the basic literature and links it with the cooperation context.
First of all, relevant contributions (of the economic and social sciences) for the topic will be identified by means of databases (e.g. EBSCO, ABI/Inform Proquest etc.). As a second step, the literature found is examined to determine whether further relevant previous articles can be identified.
For the creation of a morphological box the reciprocity types are embedded into the cooperation context.
Reciprocity has not only a cooperation promoting character, but can also make the behaviour between exchange partners expectable. These expectations are closely linked to individual motifs of action, through which the behaviour of the counterpart can be coordinated: In the sense of reciprocity, through giving gift from an actor A to an actor B, a gift in return from B to A is expected. In this way, reciprocity can be seen as a "shadow of the future" because it can have a disciplinary effect if future interactions between partners are to take place.
References:
Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Blau, P. M. (1964). Exchange and power in social life. New York: Wiley.
Emerson, R. M. (1976). Social exchange theory. Annual Review of Sociology 2, 335-362.
Hobbes, T. (1984) [1651]. Leviathan : oder Stoff, Form und Gewalt eines kirchlichen und bürgerlichen Staates. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Homans, G. C. (1961). Social behavior: Its elementary forms. New York[u.a.]: Harcourt, Brace & World, 488-531.
Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology 46(1), 35-57.
3. Governance, employment and human resource management
