Compared analysis of six Belgian breweries: impact of different property forms on the allocation of the economic surplus

In a worldwide context of crises and, more specifically, in a European context where unemployment and inequalities have increased since the eighties, a debate about the different types of entrepreneurial models has been... [ view full abstract ]

In a worldwide context of crises and, more specifically, in a European context where unemployment and inequalities have increased since the eighties, a debate about the different types of entrepreneurial models has been launched. Our research is embedded into this debate.

Our main objective is to analyse and compare the situation of the stakeholders (consumers, suppliers, workers, investors and the state) of different types of enterprises in the Belgian beer sector, covering an average period of eight years. We selected 6 breweries that represent four different corporate models: one multinational, two family SMEs, one social cooperative and two social hybrid enterprises. More precisely, two research questions are addressed in this research (the first is theoretical, the second empirical):

• How can we explain the diversification of property mode within the Belgian beer sector with economic theories?
•  How do the different governance models of the beer sector impact the surplus allocation amongst stakeholders and, more broadly, how do they impact the situation of the stakeholders?

To deal with the first question, we use the neo-institutional theories (Hansmann 1996; Petrella, 2016), the behavioural school (Borzaga et al., 2011, 2014; Gagné and Deci, 2005) and the evolutionary theories (Baudry and Chassagnon, 2014). Those theories are complementary with each other and can explain the various property modes in the beer sector.

To answer the second question, we use the annual accounts and the global productivity surplus method developed in the seventies in France by the CERC (Centre d’Etudes des Revenus et des Coûts). This original method allows us to measure the productivity surplus created by the company between two successive years and to study the repartition of this surplus amongst the stakeholders (Desmaris, 2010; Bloy et al. 2011).

We detail our empirical results in two parts: the first one is a static analysis of the initial situation of the stakeholders; the second one is a dynamic analysis of the productivity surplus creation and its distribution amongst stakeholders year after year.

The static analysis demonstrates that the workers’ situation (measured by the employment rate and the wages) is better in the social enterprises, followed by the cooperative and the SMEs and is the worst in the multinational. Conversely, the investors’ situation (measured by the ROE and the average proportion of distributed profit) is better in the multinational than in the other corporate models.

The dynamic analysis shows that the two social enterprises and the cooperative support other stakeholders than the shareholders. They tend to distribute a bigger share of the productivity surplus to the workers and suppliers. Furthermore, they have a high employment growth rate. Concerning the family SMEs, they grant favour to future investments in the surplus distribution but also give a positive amount of it to the workers. As for the multinational, it is predominantly concerned by its shareholders. It distributes most of its surplus to the investors and has the highest profit growth rate whereas it is the only one to have a negative employment growth rate. Through this empirical analysis, we show that in the Belgian beer sector, different governance models have different impacts on the situation of the stakeholders and on the surplus distribution amongst them.

Our master’s thesis is an innovative microeconomic analysis. The global productivity surplus method is a new tool to compare different corporate models and can be used to study other sectors in other countries. The method could also be relevant to make macroeconomic and sector-specific comparisons.

References

Baudry, B. and Chassagnon, V. (2014). Les théories économiques de l’entreprise. Repères, Paris, la Découverte.

Bloy, E., Ernult, J., Hudon, M. and Périlleux, A. (2011). Surplus et responsabilité sociale en microfinance : étude de cas d’institutions péruviennes. Management Prospective, (46), pp. 244–260.

Borzaga, C., Depedri, S. and Tortia, E. (2014). Organizational variety in market economies and the emergent role of socially oriented enterprises. In Defourny, J., Hulgard, L. and Pestoff, V., (editors). Social Enterprise and the Third Sector, Changing European Landscapes in a Comparative Perspective. Routledge.

Borzaga, C., Depredi, S. and Ermanno, T. (2011). Diversité des organisations dans les économies de marché, rôle des coopératives et des entreprises sociales. Revue internationale de l’économie sociale : Recma, (321), pp. 32–49.

Desmaris, C. (2010). La régionalisation ferrovière en france : une première évaluation par la méthode des comptes de surplus. Revue d’Economie Industrielle, (131), pp.69–104.

Gagné, M. and Deci, E. (2005). Self-determination theory and work motivation. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26 (4).

Hansmann, H. (1996). The ownership of Enterprise. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Petrella, F. (2003). Une analyse néo-institutionnaliste des structures de propriété “multi-stakeholder”, une application aux organisations de développement local. PhD, Université Catholique de Louvain.