Do we bear responsibility for our beliefs and attitudes? Answering this question is especially important in today’s “post-truth” cultural climate. In particular, can we choose to cultivate an active, truth-oriented approach to our thinking and belief formation, even if we do not directly control the content of our beliefs as such? A growing body of work on epistemic responsibility and doxastic voluntarism contends that we both can and should choose to control our thinking (Audi, 2001; Paul, 2015). Some philosophers have even argued that this freedom over our thought processes is the source and prerequisite of our moral agency (Clifford, 1877; Salmieri & Bayer, 2014). After all, if we cannot choose how—and whether—to think, how responsible can we be for the actions we take on the basis of our thinking (or non-thinking)?
Yet many scholars have challenged this notion of metacognitive agency, often pointing to cases in which our thinking appears to be constrained by factors outside our control. Two common sources of evidence against the robust agentic view are 1) genetic findings for the heritability of agency-relevant traits, such as intelligence and self-control (see Bouchard, 2004); and 2) mental health disorders such as addiction, which have a biological basis and purportedly rob their victims of the ability to do or think otherwise (e.g., Levy, 2011).
This project marshals theory and evidence from both behavior genetics and clinical psychology/psychiatry to sketch out a proposed mechanism by which even the most genetically vulnerable individuals can choose to change how they think. First, we present both published and original findings suggesting that deliberative thinking is less genetically constrained than other psychological traits—including intelligence, self-control, and addictive tendencies—and that thinking style, in turn, can predict how addictive tendencies develop over time. Second, we review clinical and experimental evidence that individuals with addictions and other psychiatric disorders retain at least some agency over their thought processes.
Taken together, this research points to a promising new pathway for increasing our moral agency: by internalizing the moral-epistemic norm that good living depends on active, honest thinking. Drawing on philosophical and empirical research on moral norms, we posit that baking this norm into one’s self-concept should make its value chronically salient and accessible, even when conflicting urges are present. This idea has important implications for how we understand and measure moral-epistemic agency, even in the most “volitionally-impaired” individuals.
References
Audi, R. (2001). Doxastic voluntarism and the ethics of belief. In M. Steup (Ed.), Knowledge, Truth and Duty (pp. 93-114). New York: Oxford University Press.
Bouchard, T. J., Jr. (2004). Genetic influence on human psychological traits. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13, 148–151.
Clifford, W. K. (1877). The ethics of belief. Contemporary Review, 29, 289-309.
Levy, N. (2011). Addiction and compulsion. In A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, ed. T. O’Connor and C. Sandis: 267–273. Oxford: Blackwell.
Paul, S. (2015). Doxastic Self-Control. American Philosophical Quarterly, 52(2), 145-158.
Salmieri, G., & Bayer, B. (2014). How we choose our beliefs. Philosophia, 42, 41-53.
Cognition: Education, Intelligence, Memory, Attention , Personality, Temperament, Attitudes, Politics and Religion , Psychopathology (e.g., Internalizing, Externalizing, Psychosis) , Substance use: Alcohol, Nicotine, Drugs
BGA_2018_symposium_talk_-_Gorlin_final.pdf 