The Rana Plaza collapse on 24 April, 2013 in Bangladesh was a catastrophic incident that shocked the world. Five garment factories situated in Rana Plaza were producing clothes for 29 western multinational corporations (MNCs) such as Primark and Benetton (Clean Clothes Campaign or CCC, 2015). Initially some firms, such as Walmart and Benetton, denied any involvement in the production facilities at Rana Plaza, but the CCC (2015) reported that these firms had indeed been operating there (see also Greenhouse, 2014; Kazmin, 2015). After the collapse, institutions such as the Accord (the majority of signatories of which are European retailers) and the Alliance (which operates only with US retailers) formed to monitor building standards so that such a catastrophe could never happen again. Surprisingly, the move to compensate the victims proved a very slow process (Butler, 2014) and some firms, such as Benetton, were (at least initially) reluctant to make financial contributions to aid the victims (Greenhouse, 2014; Kazmin, 2015). More worryingly, the Rana Plaza Arrangement Coordination Committee or RPACC (members of which include the likes of the International Labor Organization or ILO, Primark, and the CCC; see the full list of members in RPACC, not dated a), which was in charge of compensation, did not stipulate the need for a legally binding contract to determine who should pay whom, what criteria govern how much MNCs should pay in compensation, or what roles non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could play in the process. The payment of compensation by MNCs to the Rana Plaza Donors Trust Fund was treated as a voluntary initiative (RPACC, not dated b) and no enforceable legal framework for compensation was established (Star Business Report, 2015).
As the Rana Plaza research context is complex, requiring multiple interpretations, I will primarily highlight here the failure of donor-dependent elite NGOs by using the account of one victim, Rahima (not her real name). In 2014, I decided to become involved as I felt deeply frustrated and concerned by media reports (and by the many horror stories I had heard from friends and family members in Bangladesh) regarding the victims’ suffering and the chaotic approach to compensation. At that point, I wanted to observe the victims’ situation for myself rather than relying on third-party accounts. Consequently, I collected interviews from victims by focusing on their accounts of the collapse of Rana Plaza and compensation-related issues. I also collected interviews from various players such as NGOs, politicians, MNCs, suppliers, government officials, rescuers and volunteers to establish a comprehensive understanding of the situation. Although I have collected over 300 interviews and compiled extensive field notes (the project is still ongoing) with the help of four anthropologists, I shall use the voice of a victim to challenge the idea that elite NGOs are saviours of victims. One victim’s voice is as valuable as hundreds of voices and I argue that a powerful voice such as Rahima’s illustrates my point very well (see work of Guha, 1987; Pathak and Sundarrajan, 1989; Spivak, 1988 who used the single narrative of one subject).
Victims, NGOs, Rana Plaza, supply chain, justice, compensation.
