The Epistemological Evil of Wicked Problems

This paper explores not what we do but what we can know about wicked problems. The nature of wicked problems has long since been discussed and has been subject to typology, taxonomy and various forms of classification (for a... [ view full abstract ]

This paper explores not what we do but what we can know about wicked problems. The nature of wicked problems has long since been discussed and has been subject to typology, taxonomy and various forms of classification (for a recent example see Head and Alford, 2013). Yet they remain typically characterised as they were in the late 60s and early 70s as problems which have no clear formulation or solution. A number of things can be inferred from this, not least of which is that attempting to define a wicked problem may be a wicked problem in itself: the majority of research on wicked problems is case-based, which is necessary because each wicked problem is by definition unique. But can this lead to what we classify (with tongues somewhat in our cheeks) as epistemological evil? If each problem is unique then what can we generalise and transfer to other problems, other than lessons that are so vague that they must be interpreted by the recipient? In so doing this paper explores not only the types of knowledge that public policy and public management scholarship generate, but the theories of knowledge that underpin them. The paper is principally conceptual although it will draw on an exemplar case of a traumatic school fire that has been derived from a netnography of the event. It will argue not only that scholars need to be careful about their own claims to knowledge, but that in many cases the utility of such knowledge must also be interrogated more deeply than it is presently.