BUNDLES OF EXECUTIVE BOARD DUTIES IN HIGH-PERFORMING INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: A CONFIGURATIONAL ANALYSIS OF BOARD POWER

In this study, we examine how the power of international governmental organizations’ (IGOs) executive boards results in high organizational outcomes. This issue is relevant given the need for more effective IGOs to govern... [ view full abstract ]

In this study, we examine how the power of international governmental organizations’ (IGOs) executive boards results in high organizational outcomes. This issue is relevant given the need for more effective IGOs to govern the globe. Boards are believed to play a role in organizational performance. As is the case for business corporations, the executive boards of IGOs are vested with the generic duties to monitor and control the secretariat, provide resources and advice, help develop strategies, and participate in punctuated events (such as selecting or dismissing the chief executive officer). Thus in exploring what organizational features determine IGO performance, understanding the board/performance relationship becomes extremely relevant.

We focus particularly on the duties delegated to IGO executive boards. Board duties are a proxy of board power. Hence, our research question is: “How powerful are the executive boards of high-performing IGOs?” To answer our research question, we conduct a qualitative comparative analysis of 15 IGOs to determine the bundles of board duties causally related to high real and perceived performance.

We find that, compared to for-profit corporations, IGO executive boards are delegated with more specific duties that empower them. Additionally, we also find that board power is irrelevant for IGOs' real performance, while lower board power yields high perceived performance. This comparison is critical for IGOs because they consider not only concrete and observable results but also stakeholders’ perceptions in determining and measuring their performance.

The results of this analysis contribute to our understanding of IGO governance and other comparable organizations, such as public and non-profit organizations. This article contributes to the public management literature by cautiously building on organizational research to study the relationship between board power and organizational performance in IGOs.