Public managers’ response to performance information is of key importance for performance management to function (Moynihan & Pandey, 2010). Accordingly, it is essential to understand when and how managers use information for... [ view full abstract ]
Public managers’ response to performance information is of key importance for performance management to function (Moynihan & Pandey, 2010). Accordingly, it is essential to understand when and how managers use information for many of its relevant purposes (Kroll, 2015). An often overlooked part of this process is the way managers interpret performance information (Moynihan, 2008). Thus, we know very little about how these processes unfolds, and furthermore what results they produce. In this paper, I examine these questions with an experimental study of how public managers evaluate performance on the basis of performance information.
Building on Cyert & March’s behavioral theory of the firm (1963), the theoretical argument is that public managers use aspiration level to evaluate whether their organization is performing well. Thus, when presented with performance information managers will be highly inclined to use aspiration levels as a way of analyzing whether their organization is well-performing or not (Nielsen, 2014). Furthermore, I argue that different types of aspiration levels initiate different managerial logics in the evaluation of performance information (Behn, 2003). Coercive aspiration levels, which are political performance-targets, initiate a problem-solving logic (Salge, 2011). Accordingly, when a manager evaluates performance information based on a coercive aspiration level, they will react strongly to performance below the aspiration level. In contrast, historical aspirations will enable managers to focus on positive experiences within the organization. Thus, in an evaluation of performance relative to past performance (the historical aspiration level), a manager will also place emphasis on positive feedback, which is performance above the aspiration level (Greve, 2003).
I test these hypotheses using a survey-experiment among principals in Danish public schools. In all of the four experimental conditions, the principals were asked to evaluate the performance of a fictive school on four performance dimensions; GPA, parental satisfaction, truancy, and student well-being. In the control-group, principals were only shown the average performance-level on these four-dimensions. In the two other experimental conditions, the principals were shown either a coercive aspiration (the political goal on the performance dimension) or a historical aspiration (performance in 2013). In the last experimental condition, principals were shown both a coercive and historical aspiration on each performance dimension.
This experimental design makes it possible to answer several different questions in relation to public managers’ evaluation of performance information. First, it allows a test of whether managers evaluate performance differently depending on whether an aspiration level is available or not. Furthermore, the analysis will show if managers use a different evaluation-logic when they are presented with a coercive aspirational level compared to a historical aspiration level. Finally, based on the last experimental condition, the relative importance of coercive- and historical aspirational levels can be tested.
The results have implications for the way performance management systems are designed in general, and more specific, for the way performance information is presented to managers.
Double_Standards_JMH_IRSPM.pdf 