The doubling of auditing? Performance auditing and the self-government of supreme audit institutions

Over the last one or two decades, Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) have voluntarily invented and subjected themselves to a set of procedures, standards and regulations in order to account for their own performance, This paper... [ view full abstract ]

Over the last one or two decades, Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) have voluntarily invented and subjected themselves to a set of procedures, standards and regulations in order to account for their own performance, This paper examines how and why do SAIs in advanced liberal democracies govern themselves? On the basis of extensive document studies, it is argued that SAI self-government may be understood as the combined result of the move towards performance auditing of state institutions, which have pressured SAIs to demonstrate their impartiality and expertise, on the one hand, and the presence of a neoliberal political rationality urging SAIs to govern themselves in ways that demonstrate their impartiality and render their performance accountable.