Abstract
Several scholars have dedicated their effort toward the understanding of the likely forces that move an organization from point A to point B. In depicting the external forces more likely to improve performance, Rainey and Steinbauer (1999, 3) proposed that a public organizational performance is dependent on the level of its relationship with “oversight authorities” and “other stakeholders.” However, we still need more information about the direction and intensity of stakeholders’ role on organizational environment. We seek to learn more about the role of stakeholders by focusing on a particular type of public organization: Brazilian local governments.
Partisan alignment, as an external force, has the potential to affect government performance. If mayors are politically aligned (through partisanship or coalition-building) with central and regional governments, their localities may benefit from this situation (Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2008, Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 2008). Being politically aligned with the central government may motivate local executives to enforce policies dictated by the central government. Moreover, partisanship may also result in receiving more central government material and technical resources. In sum, local-central government partisanship is expected to contribute positively to municipal performance. Therefore,
H1: When local government dominant coalition is ideologically aligned with central government, its performance tends to be increased.
As a sort of stakeholder agenda-setting influence, we assume that money transfers, (e.g., grants), is likely to influence in a great deal local government performance. That is, greater the amount of intergovernmental grants transferred from central to local government, the higher the municipal performance. The explanation is quite logical as intergovernmental grants add to total revenues, thus increasing the money available for service delivery. Consequently,
H2: The higher the intergovernmental grants transferred down by central government, the higher the local government effectiveness in educational attainments.
To test the above propositions, we rely on a data set derived from researching 280 Brazilian municipalities. To assess local government performance, we use municipal effectiveness in improving fundamental school students’ abilities on language and mathematics. We operationalize partisan alignment with a dummy variable to measure mayor’s partisan alignment with the president and municipal grants received from central government will be used to test H2.
Our results provide no support for H1. Therefore, a mayor-president partisan alignment has no effect on local effectiveness in improving students’ educational performance. However, the findings suggest that mayors not aligned with central government policies for education achieve better results. Results also may suggest that in a country as large and as diverse as Brazil, educational policies should be formulated and implemented locally taking into account local government characteristics rather centrally. Results do support H2. That is, the higher the amount of central government transfers to local governments, in the form of grants, the higher the municipal effectiveness in improving students’ educational attainment. This study contributes to the literature on the effect of stakeholders, as they are likely to set up the agenda-setting, thus influencing organizational outcomes.
Keywords: stakeholder influences; performance management; partisan alignment; fiscal federalism; Brazil
Rainey, Hal G., and Paula Steinbauer. 1999. "Galloping……
