The relationship between politics and administration is a classical issue in the public administration debate. However, from the advent of the NPM onward there has been an increased attention towards performance measurement and management and measuring performance has become almost universal, but ‘politicians do not take much interest – unless and until disasters, scandals, or breakdowns come along. . . . Performance measurement and management remain activities conducted chiefly by and for managers’ (Pollitt, 2006: 41). Some studies, however, show that politicians use information about organizational performance throughout the decision making process (Askim, 2007).
There are few studies in central government regarding the use of performance management systems and they are mainly related to the use of performance information in budget formulation (OECD, 2013) or about performance contract control of senior bureaucrats (Hondeghem and Van Dorpe, 2012) and about evaluation reports in law-making committees (Whiteman, 1996).
Most studies are about the local level, such as those related to councillor evaluation of performance information (Bogt, 2004), local politician receptivity to financial and non-financial performance information (Liguori, Sicilia and Steccolini, 2012; Walker, Jung and Boyne, 2013) and the use of performance information for blame avoidance (Nielsen and Baekgaard, 2013).
This paper aims to investigate whether and how the adoption of performance management systems in public sector organizations has changed the politics administration relationship in two different contexts (Italy and Australia) characterized by different degrees of implementation of managerial reforms. Through an analysis of the literature and a comparison between case studies, this paper sheds light on how a PMS may be used in creating and managing the relationship between politics and administration.
• Askim, J. 2007. How do politicians use performance information? An analysis of the Norwegian local government experience, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 73(3):453–472.
• Bogt, H. T. 2004. ‘Politicians in search of performance information? Survey research on Dutch aldermen’s use of performance information’, Financial Accountability & Management, 20 (3): 221-52.
• Hondeghem, A. and Van Dorpe, K. ‘Performance management systems for senior public servants: How strong is the managerial public service bargain?, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 79 (1): 9-27.
• Liguori, M., Sicilla, M. and Steccolini, I. 2012. ‘Some like it non-financial . . . Politicians’ and managers’ views on the importance of performance information’, Public Management Review, 14 (7): 903-22.
• Nielsen P.A., Baekgaard M. 2013. Performance Information, Blame Avoidance, and Politicians’ Attitudes to Spending and Reform: Evidence from an Experiment, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 24 (2): 431-458.
• OECD. 2013. ‘Government at a Glance 2013’, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/gov_glance-2013-en.
• Pollitt, C. 2006. ‘Performance Management in Practice: A Comparative Study of Executive Agencies’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 16(1): 25–44.
• Walker, R., C. Jung and G. Boyne. 2013. ‘Marching to different drummers? The performance effects of alignment between political and managerial perceptions of performance management’, Public Administration Review, 73 (6): 833-844.
Whiteman, D. 1996. Communication in Congress: Members, Staff and the Search for Information. Lawrence, University of Kansas Press.
