A zero-sum game? How the Danish supreme audit institution straddles between independence and relevance

Supreme audit institutions (SAIs) are widely regarded as fundamental institutions in liberal democracies by checking the power exercised by governments. To remain so, they must enjoy a strong level of independence from... [ view full abstract ]

Supreme audit institutions (SAIs) are widely regarded as fundamental institutions in liberal democracies by checking the power exercised by governments. To remain so, they must enjoy a strong level of independence from executive power. Over the last few decades, SAIs are increasingly expected also to be relevant for government and the execution of its policies. SAIs have reacted by stepping up their performance audits. But is it possible to be independent from and relevant for the government at once? This paper examines how the Danish SAI seek to manage these two principles. It is argued that their simultaneous pursuit is highly challenging, but that it may - if handled properly - amount to a modest plus-sum game. More specifically, the Danish SAI seems to enjoy a very high level of independence from shifting governments. Yet, it is somewhat less successful in achieving relevance partly because of concerns of independence. The paper discusses possible ways for the Danish SAI to improve its relevance while retaining its high level of independence.