The crisis that erupted in 2008 forced governments throughout the world to implement cutbacks. The management of cutbacks within public organizations is one of the key responsibilities of public managers. In order to influence the decision that are made within their organization, public managers use multiple causal channels (Meier, OToole, & Nicholson-Crotty, 2005) and interact with actors on different positions. Being at the intersection of different imperatives (Williams & Shearer, 2011), public managers find themselves in the center of networks of information, resources flows and personal loyalty (Rainey, 2005). By managing upward, to their (political) superiors, downward, to their subordinates, and outward to external actors, public managers are able to influence decision-making and implementation (Head, 2010). One of the actors that public managers interact with, are their political superiors. The interaction between political and public actors has often been characterized in terms of political-administrative relationships. Political-administrative relationships can be considered as a “vital but delicate part of the fabric of government” (’t Hart & Wille, 2006: p. 143). The recent financial crisis may put this delicate relationship to the test, considering internal budget cuts that many public organizations are currently facing (Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015). The aim of this study is to analyse the role of political-administrative relationships for cutback management.
Based on the literature, it may be expected that political-administrative relationships may manifests itself differently in the different phases of the cutback management process and therewith having a different role when it comes to managing budget. In the decision-making phase, political leaders will be more inclined to cut back on operational expenditures (that is, cuts for the administrative apparatus) compared to making cuts for policy programs. Administrative leaders, on the contrary, are expected to act in a self-interested way and try to prevent cuts in their own organization (Raudla, Savi, & Randma-Liiv, 2015). Therefore, it may be expected that a conflict of interest between public and political leaders will arise in this phase. Moreover, when it is decided that cuts on operational expenditures have been made, public managers still have options to fight cutbacks, implement these or use a combination of both (Lambright, 1998). Which choice is made, is likely to influence political-administrative relationships and may also influence the implementation phase. In this phase, a more cooperative relationship between public and political actors might be necessary in order to successfully implement the cuts (Fernandez & Rainey, 2006) and the changes that cutbacks usually entail (Van der Voet & Van de Walle, 2015). In short, political-administrative relationships might look rather different in different phases of the cutback management process and accordingly, affect cutback management in different ways.
This study used a qualitative case study. Cutbacks in the Dutch prison sector were studied. Public managers and politicians have been interviewed for this study, along with an analysis of relevant documents. Findings contribute to our understanding of cutback management by public leaders in public organizations, as well as to the literature on political-administrative relationships by focusing on the specific context of cutbacks.
