Monitoring Accountability in Democratic Systems: The Public View of Performance Management

This paper concentrates on the role of ordinary citizens in monitoring accountability in the public sector. Since accountability is mainly about reporting and taking responsibility for actions and outcomes, it can be enhanced... [ view full abstract ]

This paper concentrates on the role of ordinary citizens in monitoring accountability in the public sector. Since accountability is mainly about reporting and taking responsibility for actions and outcomes, it can be enhanced by well-functioning performance management mechanisms. However, such mechanisms are often distorted by gaming strategies that public officials use, meaning that the public has an essential role in monitoring such systems and demanding accountability. Furthermore, while the literature focuses on the performance information used by public officials, there is also a need to study this question in relation to the citizens who are both the subjects of this data and the supervisors of public officials.
The authors explore the conditions required for citizens to monitor public officials so that they do not manipulate and distort performance goals, measures and data. The authors do so by analyzing citizens’ perceptions about various aspects of performance management systems using a survey distributed among a representative sample of the Israeli population in 2016.
The analysis reveals several factors that may increase citizens’ willingness to monitor accountability. All of them reflect the idea that citizens view these interactions in terms of collective action problems aimed at minimizing free riding. To a large extent, public officials and government policy are less relevant to their decisions. Thus, ordinary citizens will be more willing to monitor performance management systems if they believe that it is very likely that a critical mass of citizens will do so and that the performance indicators influence their lives and can benefit them. Citizens form their beliefs about these issues based on their evaluation of the willingness of a critical mass of citizens to pay the costs related to monitoring activities, the resulting perceived price that public officials pay if gaming is discovered, and the effectiveness of the available means for monitoring public officials. Note that the public’s willingness to pay for such monitoring must be translated into increased costs for inept public officials in order to influence the former’s willingness to monitor the latter’s accountability. This reasoning seems complex, but it is very logical for citizens to form their preferences in such a way. Such complex reasoning requires personal and social awareness, which often characterizes people with higher education. Indeed, our analysis holds primarily for those people. It is striking, however, and somehow counter-intuitive that citizens discount the abilities and reliability of public officials when deciding whether to monitor their accountability.
The analysis implies that public monitoring primarily depends on the civic culture and democratic norms that can help overcome collective action problems. These are also the conditions under which performance management mechanisms will prove beneficial for society. Therefore, those who want to minimize gaming activities and encourage truthful reporting and accountability should strengthen these aspects in society and politics rather than focusing on “educating” public servants or forcing them to avoid gaming and take responsibility. Such actions alone will simply be ineffective.