How can performance management influence public sector agencies to improve their performance? This question has long been the subject of intense discussion among scholars (see De Bruijn, 2007; Van Dooren et al., 2010; Talbott,... [ view full abstract ]
How can performance management influence public sector agencies to improve their performance? This question has long been the subject of intense discussion among scholars (see De Bruijn, 2007; Van Dooren et al., 2010; Talbott, 2010). It is often the case that public sector units have no motivation to improve beyond the minimum level required to stay safe. As Smith (1995), Van Thiel and Leeuw (2002), Bevan and Hood (2006), Radnor (2008) and Kalgin (2016) noted, there is a ratchet or threshold effect, and the data manipulation strategies of both reckless and prudent bureaucrats can also result in unambitious average (target) syndrome.
A similar phenomenon potential to arise with the introduction of the Minimum Service Standards (MSS) for local authorities within Indonesia’s decentralised system. As a consequence of it, inequality has grown, reflecting the different capacities and motivations of local governments. Yet, the central government has (in principle) a reserve power to intervene and enforce these minimum standards. Thus, instead of a set target or rank for local government, MSS was introduced as a form of compromise between the central and local governments in relation to the minimum quality of services that should be delivered by local governments.
This paper attempts to assess the influence of public sector performance management on the motivation of local public sector agencies to improve their performance. There are two main research questions. Firstly, what is the influence of MSS on the motivation of public sector agencies to improve their performance in delivering services? Secondly, how far does the concept of an unambitious average (target) explain the outcomes attained? Semi-structured interviews with 80 informants in central and local government, as well as scholars, non-government organisations and international agencies were used in data collection, with thematic analysis used for data analysis.
In terms of the results, the influence of MSS on the motivation of local governments to improve their performance hardly fits with the idea of the ‘unambitious average (target)’ syndrome. MSS seems only to motivate improvements in performance among those local governments whose current achievement falls just below the required standard. They are motivated only to pass and deliver just above the required standard as this will then enable them to fall safely in the middle and avoid inspection by auditors or higher authorities. MSS, however, does not appear to motivate local governments delivering either well above or well below the standards. In addition, in line with the idea of an unambitious average (target) syndrome, local governments currently achieving at levels far above the standards do not pay them much attention nor are they motivated to improve their performance, despite having the ability to do so. Beyond the notion of reaching an unambitious average (target), the introduction of MSS has not motivated local governments whose current performance falls far below the standards to improve. In some cases, they may be willing to improve their performance but they have no capacity to achieve it, and, besides, there is also little in the way of enforcement.
H2 - Performance management in the public sector – practices and real effects in developed
