The study aims to investigate the discharge of public accountability of Thai central governments to allow the public to monitor on their performance. Monitoring/scrutinizing process is one essential tool for streamlining the performance of governmental entities (Mulgan, 2003). Based on performance reported, the public can assign rewards or sanctions of which the awareness is a constraint for the government to take any consequential action (James & John, 2006; Tetlock, 1985).
Public accountability of the government is undermined when the accounts are not available or sufficient to the public and hence limiting the public to understand about their government’s performance (Bovens, 2007; Perks, 1993). Arguably, such poor public accountability of the government is related to corruption (Klitgaad, 2010). Thailand is one example of which its government’s public accountability is criticized as poor and corruption is highlighted (Poapongsakorn, 2012). Various accountability literature has suggested a framework of what type of accountability information governmental entities can disclose (Day & Klein, 1987; Glenn & Murphy, 1996; Hyndman & Anderson, 1995; Stewart, 1984).
This study focuses on the Thai central government departments and measures their performance information’s availability from their websites over the last five years, starting from 2011-2015. The result can provide empirical evidence to support or otherwise the availability of the account for government departments. Of those departments, content analysis based on the literature will also be measured, using disclosure index. The result is expected to identify how different types of accountability are operationalized at different level of availability across the departments. In practice, the result may provide suggestions to related bodies to enforce the availability and certain disclosures of the performance information for greater public accountability.
References:
Bovens, M. (2007). Public Accountability. In E Ferlie, L Lynn, & C. Pollitt (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Management: Oxford University Press.
Day, P., & Klein, R. (1987). Accountabilities: Five public services. London: Tavistock.
Glenn, J., & Murphy, M. (1996). Public management failing accountabilities and failing performance review. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 9(5/6), 125-137.
Hyndman, N., & Anderson, R. (1995). The use of performance information in external reporting: An empirical study of UK executive agencies. Financial Accountability & Management, 11(1), 1-17.
James, O., & John, P. (2006). Public management at the ballot box: Performance information and electoral support for incumbent English local governments. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 17, 567-580.
Klitgaad, R. (2010). The Future of Corruption by prof. Robert Klitgaad. Retrieved from http://www.transparentnizakazky.cz/novinky/130-the-future-of-corruption-by-prof-robert-klitgaard
Mulgan, R. (2003). Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies (1 ed.). United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.
Perks, R. W. (1993). Accounting and society. London Chapman & Hall.
Poapongsakorn, N. (2012, 12 November, 2012) Stop corruptions to increase Thai economy pentecy/Interviewer: C. Sahaskul. Economics Associaiton by Thammasart University.
Stewart, J. D. (1984). The role of information in public accountability. In A. Hopwood & C. Tomkins (Eds.), Issues in Public Sector Accounting (pp. 13-34). Oxford: Philip Allen.
Tetlock, P. E. (1985). Accountability: The neglected social context of judgement and choice. Research in Organizational Behavior, 7, 297-332.
G1 - Accounting and Accountability – Constructing society – History, culture, politics and
