Safety with ERTMS under scrutiny

The EU goals for future railway operations results in a shared need for a system that allows us to safely operate cross borders, in a uniform and safe technical environment. Current focus tends to be on the benefits when... [ view full abstract ]

The EU goals for future railway operations results in a shared need for a system that allows us to safely operate cross borders, in a uniform and safe technical environment. Current focus tends to be on the benefits when implementing the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) at corridors, less focus is on implementation at stations and railway yards. In the European Railway Industry we face similar challenges and risks and can therefor benefit from the lessons learned in other countries. The paper gives insight into railway safety under ERTMS and that the expected increase of safety is not self-evident. With current incident numbers (18 SPADS in 2016) the desired safety improvement with the implementation of ERTMS might become a myth. 

ERTMS is the future standard railway management system that enables interoperability between countries, increase capacity and significantly improve the rail safety level in Europe according to the EU. Several countries have published reports showing implementation proves to be a challenge and the system is less uniform and user friendly as perhaps desirable. The day to day train operations requires a more flexible use of the system than it may have been designed for.

This paper would like to discuss the lessons learned from SPAD incidents on ERTMS track in the Netherlands. SPADS are seen as the primary incident potentially resulting in a train collision and compared to the conventional safety system the SPAD numbers are high. When considering safety features of the system it is often a comparison between ERTMS level 1 and level 2, however analyses of incidents show that the safety level is dependent on the mode in which the train operates, this may results in the train driver being the last barrier. Under full supervision the system provides a high safety level, however SPADS do happen. Also Shunting Mode, Staff Responsible and other mode each provide a different but minimal safety level and Human Factor challenges for train drivers and therefor railway safety.

The system is complex on it’s own and for the users, to maintain an equal safety level as the current system with ERTMS a different infra structure layout is required at railway yards. Past and current incidents give us valuable data and a better understanding of the limitations and complexity of ERTMS, however a solution is not yet found. Analyses of incidents has taught us that the implementation of ERTMS needs to be treated as a complete system change. To support technical decisions and investments for nationwide implementation of ERTMS we are developing a tool with the purpose to reevaluate infrastructure layout at yards to limit SPAD evoking circumstances. The tool calculates risks for certain routings under specific technical circumstances. The paper will give more insight into the basic understandings of this tool.

The challenge that lies ahead is to find an affordable solution for ERTMS to solve technical and Human Factors issues without loss for performing normal daily operations whilst creating a safer and interoperable system.