Elaine Thompson
Mott MacDonald
Elaine is a Chartered Occupational Psychologist with over 15 years’ professional experience in rail. She has experience of assessing the impact of ETCS on train drivers, and issues around the fitment of the ETCS Driver Machine Interface on a range of projects. Elaine led the RSSB T906 study considering the options for integration of the ETCS DMI with AWS and TPWS, subsequently conducted tender reviews for ETCS retrofit for NJRP, and was technical lead for the development of the ATOC guidance note for ETCS DMI retrofit.
The Belgian railway network has embarked on a Master Plan from 2011 to bring all of the rail network under the umbrella protection of European Train Control System (ETCS), and the migration path towards this long-term vision is well underway (Infrabel, 2011).
Federale Overheidsdienst Mobiliteit en Vervoer (FOD MV) have commissioned work to understand in more detail the impact of the ETCS rollout on the Belgian rail network on operational safety. Specifically, the transitions from ETCS L1 Full Supervision (FS) to Limited Supervision (LS) mode, Transmission Balise Locomotive Driving aid system (TBL1+, which is conventional signalling) or other legacy systems and the potential to add hazards from a human factors perspective. There has been some research performed internationally to review the impact of transitions between ETCS and legacy train protection systems at the end state (implementation complete), but there has been little work done to review the impact of transitions during the migration when there are frequent changes to the rail network and the roll out of technology is in a much more transient state.
The objective for this study was to understand in more detail the operational hazards that could be introduced during the ETCS rollout and their impact on the operational safety, specifically at transitions between train protection systems requiring different signal observation styles i.e. ETCS L1 FS and TBL1+. This analysis can support stakeholders in implementing measures to prevent future hazards and inform the planning of the remaining migration works. This study has been delivered using three areas of analysis:
Interview with Operational Representatives
Review of SPAD incident reports
Human error quantification of transitions.
The study identified a number of operational safety risks associated with the ETCS roll out, and particularly the location of, and management of transitions. The differences between experienced and less experienced drivers also appeared to be a factor both in terms of managing the changing attentional demands associated with transitions, and their ability to manage train speed and braking distance in both ETCS L1 FS and TBL1+ modes.
By understanding the potential for human error in relation to transitions, the study has suggested that there are some organisational issues that could be improved relating to the co-ordination between the Operations and Infrastructure design and engineering functions to design and plan the migration roll out strategy and the location of transitions between ETCS L1 FS, and L2 FS and TBL1+.
An improved driver training programme which highlights the differences in driving between ETCS and TBL1+ and the knowledge, skills and behaviours required to effectively drive in each mode, with a particular focus on transitions should be provided. In addition, training in the ‘non-technical skills’ relating to maintaining attention, situation awareness, managing workload etc. should be provided to drivers to support them in the changes to the driving task.
Train driving models and performance , Train control systems including ERTMS, class B systems, GSM-R and Automatic Train Operatio , Human error and human reliability
