In August 2015, Halifax Harbour Bridges (HHB) (Halifax, Canada) began an 18-month, $150-million project to re-deck the suspended spans of the Macdonald Bridge. It is the second time in history the suspended spans of a bridge... [ view full abstract ]
In August 2015, Halifax Harbour Bridges (HHB) (Halifax, Canada) began an 18-month, $150-million project to re-deck the suspended spans of the Macdonald Bridge. It is the second time in history the suspended spans of a bridge have been replaced at night while in use during the day. The bridge is closed to traffic 7 pm to 6 am, and at least 10 full weekend closures are anticipated. The impact will be significant—up to 48,000 vehicles, 700 cyclists and 750 pedestrians cross the Bridge every day.
What constitutes ‘critical infrastructure’ (CI) and how we manage it are deeply embedded in social context (Boholm, 2012). The HHB’s assumption of control over the project exemplifies a rationalist’s bias; before re-decking began, there was only a modest degree of community awareness of the project but since re-decking began, the impact has been felt broadly (e.g. people who work non-standard hours and disadvantaged groups with the least capacity to adapt, including low-income workers); there has been increased media coverage and a broader interpretation of a major CI event that is occurring in plain view in the Halifax Harbour.
Risk governance can be defined as the totality of actors, rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms concerned with how relevant risk information is collected, analysed and communicated, and management decisions are taken (Renn and Walker 2008). That different risk traditions exist, use different methods and tools and have different interpretations of events is not new. What is less clear, however, is how these competing rationales are acknowledged, accommodated and reconciled (or rejected). Equally, the model assumes a degree of consistency in the social context; less has been written about how the model can help us to understand a dynamic process in which the key issues are reframed from complex to uncertain to ambiguous (Renn, 2008), and how this re-framing influences human behaviour and risk processes.
Before re-decking began, we conducted a survey of the general public's risk perceptions and coping intentions (n=2000), and conducted focus groups and semi-structured interviews with CI operators. In this paper, we compare our initial findings with a survey of the general public (n=2000) conducted four months after re-decking began to investigate any differences between their initial risk perceptions / coping intentions with their lived experiences. We believe this case offers a powerful learning opportunity for those studying the fuzzy concept of ‘Smart City.’
Learning from major events , Risk policy and regulation
